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CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
Matthew Nimetz*
After five years of experience with the Helsinki Final Act, the
thirty-five signatory countries are about to hold in Madrid a second follow-up conference to assess the record of implementation
and consider what new steps might be taken to further the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
hereinafter CSCE. Now is a good time to take stock of where
CSCE has been and where it is likely to go in the future.
The Helsinki process seeks to address the United States basic
foreign policy dilemma: how can two competing and largely antagonistic systems co-exist in a manner that protects United
States security and at the same time creates opportunities to increase areas of cooperation. The Final Act itself seeks to address
the universal desire of all peoples for basic human rights and
freedoms. For this reason, the United States does not conceive of
the Helsinki process as a bloc-to-bloc confrontation, although we
have no illusions that the problem of the East is at present our
central consideration. By taking account of the various wishes
and hopes of the signatory nations, the Helsinki process helps to
keep open channels of communication on sensitive issues in a way
which shows promise of encouraging the improvements the
United States seeks. This process, however, can only be kept alive
through our commitment to make it work and to use its potential
continuously to attain our objectives.
Let me first briefly review the genesis of the Final Act. We are
all familiar with the post-war situation as it developed in Europe
following the World War II victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany. The nature of the post-war division of territory, people and
value systems is still, more than a generation later, at the heart of
the current political strains in Europe. In the period after the Soviet Union consolidated its control over Eastern Europe, Moscow
* Mr. Ninetz, LL.B., Harvard University, 1965, serves as Under Secretary of
State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. As a Rhodes scholar, he
received an,M.A. from Balliol College, Oxford University.
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devoted its efforts to legitimize its post-war sphere of domination.
To achieve this end, and to exclude the United States from Europe, the USSR sought a conference solely of European states to
finalize the frontier arrangements which had existed de facto
since the end of World War II. The West stood firm against these
Soviet desires, since we had no interest in unilaterally granting
legal recognition to the USSR's territorial gains. The United
States and our Allies, in addition, saw that such a Soviet-sponsored European conference would be used by them to weaken the
relationship between the United States, Canada and Western European nations, as institutionalized in the NATO alliance.
In the late sixties, as a part of the general relaxation of tensions, a European conference became of greater interest throughout the West. The NATO alliance expressed cautious interest in
such a conference, provided the United States and Canada took
part. Simultaneously during this period, the Federal Republic of
Germany introduced its Ostpolitik in part to ameliorate various
intra-German problems, and the United States was working directly with the Soviet Union on a number of specific questions
such as improvements in the Berlin situation, SALT I, nonproliferation and various other issues.
The policy of Western nations in the early seventies was to
work toward a relaxation of political tension and a reduction of
the all too real risks of nuclear war. This effort, of course, is now
known by the short-hand term - detente. One of the concrete
and continuing results of detente was the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. Preparatory talks opened in Helsinki
in late 1972 and negotiations continued there and in Geneva to
work out the outlines of the Final Act.
Since security concerns such as SALT, the Mutual Balanced
Force Reduction negotiations and other such specific topics were
being handled separately in their own restricted forums, the concept of security embodied in the Final Act was understood to be a
much broader one. The Helsinki negotiators sought to enhance
the sense of security among all the participating nations by expanding cooperation among them, especially between Eastern and
Western nations, in a wide range of areas including economic, humanitarian, educational and cultural. The practical expression of
this organizational concept resulted in the division of the Final
Act into three basic areas which have commonly been called Baskets. Basket I cofitained a Declaration of Principles of Interstate
Behavior, such as sovereign equality and restraint from the use of
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force, principles which were consistent with the UN Charter and
other declarations of international law.
Basket I also contained a very important affirmation of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious practice, as
one of the ten principles governing the relations among the participating states. The inclusion of this principle was a difficult
achievement and was accomplished by careful drafting which produced wording similar to, and consistent with, earlier statements
in such documents as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the UN covenants on human rights. In restating this principle, the Helsinki signatories not only affirmed
their commitment to such freedoms, they also specifically reaffirmed the earlier and more basic documents. The signatories implicitly affirmed the principle that true detente-and true security-rested in the final analysis upon respect for human rights. It
is important to keep in mind that this part of Basket I, rather
than the well-publicized Basket III, contains the major human
rights provisions of the Final Act.
Also included in Basket I is an innovative and important security component called "Confidence Building Measures." Realizing
that the building of trust is an important component of security,
the Final Act provides for the prior notification of certain troop
maneuvers and movements, and exchange of observers among the
signatories at military maneuvers.
Basket II deals with economics, science and technology, and
Basket III with cooperation in cultural, humanitarian and other
fields. These Baskets outline specific areas of cooperation which
nations should pursue to strengthen interchange and improve the
conditions of life for their people.
The Final Act is not a treaty. It is instead a solemn agreement
among the signatories to seek the political objectives outlined in
the Act. Inherent in the Final Act's provisions was the desire to
reduce the level of confrontation between East and West and to
contribute to the spirit of detente. Also implicit in the provisions
was a commitment to increase the dialogue among the parties,
especially between Eastern and Western nations.
The negotiators created a delicately balanced document. They
had to because CSCE works by consensus. The opposition of even
one state is sufficient to block a decision. The Final Act contained
items of importance to each participant. All thirty-five were,
quite obviously, interested in a strengthened sense of security in
Europe. For the Soviet Union, CSCE implied a certain degree of
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acceptance of the post-World War II territorial frontiers in Europe, since the signatories agreed to seek no change in frontiers
except by peaceful means. For many of the East European states,
it established a framework that permitted greater interaction
with Western countries than was previously possible. For the neutral and non-aligned states, CSCE provided a forum in which to
pursue European-wide interests. Thus, Switzerland, which is not
a member of the UN, plays a creative political role in Europe, the
Vatican pursues its important moral and institutional goals, while
Malta expresses its interests in Mediterranean issues. For the
West, the Final Act gave us a means to promote the exchange of
people and ideas and to seek peaceful evolution in the systems
that govern the populations of the USSR and the countries of
Eastern Europe, and provided as well a concrete affirmation of
the right of states to raise humanitarian concerns in a diplomatic
context. In the United States view, the Final Act achieved enormous success in making explicit the notion that improved human
rights would be a permanent factor in the detente equation. This
may have been an unexpected turn of events for the Soviet Union
but it quickly became plain that the inclusion of the human
rights concept was to be essential to the CSCE process.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Helsinki is that it created a process for continuous dialogue between the East and
West. It also provided a platform from which the signatory nations legitimately could talk about sensitive concerns with their
neighbors, concerns that previously were difficult to voice in a
diplomatic context. This was accomplished through the establishment of a unique system of follow-up meetings which allows-or
more accurately, requires-the signatory nations to review with
each other on a continuing basis the progress being made toward
the implemehtation of the Final Act's provisions. By establishing
a mechanism to review implementation of the political objectives
to which they had agreed, the Helsinki signatories initiated a process that is as important as the text of the Final Act itself.
The first of these follow-up meetings took place in Belgrade in
1977 and 1978. The Belgrade meeting showed our serious commitment to implementation and to the process itself. Under the distinguished leadership of Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the
United States delegation made a strong effort to enhance implementation of the Final Act by all signatories. Although some may
have preferred a more anodyne approach to the meeting, we believed that it was important, at the first Helsinki follow-up meet-
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ing, to articulate our determination that the commitments made
at Helsinki be taken seriously. Our determination has not
diminished.
Since the Belgrade meeting, there have been numerous bilateral
and multilateral talks among the signatories as called for in the
Final Act. Our Government has held CSCE consultations with
nearly all the members of the Warsaw Pact, with all of our NATO
allies and with most of the neutral or non-aligned signatories such
as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. We have also
met on several occasions with the Spanish government, host for
the next review conference in Madrid. Our experience in the bilateral discussions with Eastern countries has been moderately
encouraging. The talks were frank, extensive and specific. We intend to continue these consultations with the hope that progress
can be made in the period before the Madrid meeting. These regular and extensive bilateral meetings are an important development since Belgrade and the existence of these intensive talks has
caused the Helsinki process to take on greater vitality.
The CSCE policy of the United States is conducted under the
guidance of the Department of State. Work in preparation for
Madrid has been underway since last summer in close collaboration with other Departments, agencies and government bodies,
and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[hereinafter the Commission]. The Commission is an important
partner in our preparations. It was established by the Congress in
1976 to monitor and encourage implementation of the Final Act.
The Commission is composed of six Congressmen, six Senators,
and three members of the Executive Branch, and is chaired by
Congressman Dante Fascell. The staff of the Commission has participated in State Department working groups and taken part in
bilateral consultations on CSCE. The staff produces a regular flow
of reports to the Congress and the public on issues of Final Act
implementation and CSCE-related events.
One of these reports, on implementation of the Final Act in the
United States, will hopefully set an example for other CSCE participants to follow. The report examines the criticisms made of
US implementation by foreign and domestic critics and is the
first review of its kind to be conducted by any signatory. The
Commission has had the full cooperation of the Administration in
preparing this report, and we were gratified by the outcome.
While the implementation record of the United States is not perfect, the basic conclusion of the Commission is that the United
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States record is very good and that there is a demonstrated commitment, in keeping with the significance which President Carter
attaches to full implementation of the Final Act, to pursue continued progress. This is a record which we will be proud to take to
Madrid.
I wish I could report that all other signatories are doing as well.
Ever since the signing of the Final Act the Soviet Union and certain of its allies in Eastern Europe have failed to implement the
human rights commitments which they made at Helsinki. The expression of dissenting political views, including demands for basic
human rights, respect for the Helsinki Final Act and even the national laws supposedly in effect in these countries, has been severely punished. The leaders of Helsinki Monitoring Groups in
the Soviet Union-Orlov, Shcharansky, Rudenko, Petkus, Gajauskas and others-have been imprisoned or sent into exile. People
seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union have been denied employment as well as permission to exercise their right to leave
their own country. The Catholic Church in Lithuania faces pressure from atheistic Soviet authorities in spite of pledges to allow
freedom of worship. Other religions face similar difficulties. In
Czechoslavakia, the leaders of the Charter 77 dissident group
have been persecuted and imprisoned. Early in 1980 the Soviets
culminated a severe campaign of repression by banishing Nobel
Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov to a city where foreigners
are not permitted.
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, however, has called into question fundamental principles of international conduct-principles
upon which East-West stability has rested since World War II
and which are fundamental to the Helsinki agreement. The first
Basket of the Final Act is a virtual catalogue of principles violated by the Soviet invasion.
-

Principle One: Sovereign equality of nations
Principle Two: Refraining from the threat or use of force
Principle Three: Inviolability of frontiers
Principle Four: Territorial integrity of states
Principle Six: Non-intervention in internal affairs
Principle Eight: Equal rights and self-determination of peoples

Afghanistan is not a party to the Helsinki Agreement, but we
must ask ourselves whether the Soviet Union, which feels free to
violate such basic principles of conduct in Afghanistan, is not undercutting the basic norms of international conduct embodied in
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the United Nations Charter in a manner that threatens the peace
and security of all regions of the world, including Europe.
Given this discouraging record, one must assess why it is in our
interest to persevere in CSCE. We have made this assessment and
conclude that there are important ways in which CSCE continues
to serve our interests and the interests of human rights.
First, it has set a standard by which the actions of all participating states will henceforth be judged. We should not underestimate the importance of this fact. CSCE has made the human
rights practices of our fellow signatories an object of legitimate
concern and protest, heightening our awareness of our obligations
to speak out and ensuring that abuses of fundamental human
rights will no longer go unremarked and unchallenged. We can
hope that the steady pressure of the world opinion, focused by
CSCE on repressive practices, will gradually affect the actions of
governments-first in marginal cases, but eventually in more fundamental ways.
We should also be aware that CSCE has helped to break
down-however slightly-the bloc-to-bloc configuration of European politics which for years prevented us from establishing lines
of communication to many countries of Eastern Europe. The Final Act is an agreement between thirty-five sovereign states, without regard to political or military alignment. It has become a palpable and growing element in European politics, one which
promotes discussion over confrontation and provides new opportunities for the countries of Eastern Europe to establish-albeit
tentatively-their separate identities as independent nations. We
are encouraged by signs that the Eastern Europeans value their
CSCE relationship with us and by the progress which has been
made-in Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the
German Democratic Republic for example-in resolving family
reunification and emigration issues. By helping put our relations
with these countries on a more normal basis, CSCE is perhaps a
harbinger of the future Europe we all hope to build.
CSCE has other benefits. Itrepresents a definitive recognition
of the fact that the United States plays a central role in the future of Europe and provides us with a forum which includes all
the European states (except Albania), the United States and Canada, where we can meet to discuss political, economic and humanitarian issues of common concern. In the area of security, for
example, CSCE has established a means of creating a regime of
confidence-building measures which has the long-term potential
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for enhancing the warning time of a surprise attack and helping
to stabilize the security situation in Europe. In the area of economic and environmental cooperation, the Treaty on Transboundary Air Pollution signed last November is a good example
of an agreement made possible by the existence of CSCE and the
Helsinki process. We hope in the future to use this process to
help us find systematic solutions to issues like family reunification which are of central concern to us.
Finally, CSCE serves to remind the free nations of the West of
the principles and values which bind them together and, which in
the end, are the source of their collective strength.
As we look forward to the Madrid meeting, we are conscious
that the atmosphere of East-West relations has been gravely
damaged by recent events. Nevertheless, the goals we have set for
ourselves remain valid:
- To encourage substantive progress in human rights performance by Eastern countries before, during, and after the Madrid
meeting;
- To ensure a thorough review of implementation, especially of
the humanitarian and human rights elements in the Final Act;
- To promote US security and economic goals;
- To maintain a balance among the various Baskets of CSCE,
and to ensure that all subjects receive full attention and exposure.
The United States is, however, realistic. What is possible at
Madrid will depend to a large extent on actions taken by others.
To ensure a useful and productive meeting at Madrid, we need
action to resolve outstanding human rights cases like those of the
Helsinki monitors and Charter 77 and an end to Soviet Union
aggression in Afghanistan. For our part, we will continue to insist
on a thorough review of implementation, not only at Madrid, but
in our consultations with other signatories prior to Madrid.
The tenor of the review of implementation at Madrid will depend on the extent of progress in implementing the Final Act.
The United States intends to offer a calm, but frank, assessment.
We must hope that in the time remaining before Madrid, governments will improve their performance. We will carefully assess
the degree of implementation in areas such as family reunification, free movement of people and exchange of ideas, the rights of
journalists to be free of constraints, the obligation of states to
permit citizens to know and act upon the Final Act, and observance of Principle VII and the other Principles.
Follow-up meetings are also an opportunity to adopt new mea-
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sures to improve implementation, increase cooperation, and further the goals of the Final Act. At Belgrade it proved impossible
to win the thirty-five nation consensus necessary for agreement
on new proposals. Of the many ideas presented, the only ones
which were eventually adopted were for three experts' meetings,
two of which had been foreseen in the Final Act. Some believe
that a discussion of implementation had the effect of souring the
atmosphere at Belgrade so as to make a broader agreement impossible. The United States believes that the critical issue at Belgrade and again at Madrid is whether there has been any implementation, and if so, where and how much. In our view the first
priority of the CSCE must be to ensure that the agreement we
have already reached through years of tough negotiations-the
Final Act-is implemented. Enthusiasm for new proposals and
"concrete results" should not lead us to overlook deficiencies in
carrying out existing commitments.
That being said, we hope that at Madrid it will be possible to
agree on a limited and balanced number of new proposals. The
concept of balance is central here. It will be essential that Madrid
provide for progress in all major aspects of CSCE. Some signatories, for example, are clearly less interested in one area than in
others. We look for Madrid to produce agreement on an array of
new proposals which will reflect the balance inherent in the Final
Act and particularly the realization that respect for human rights
is as much a basis for detente in the CSCE context as military
security.
We have the proposals tabled at Belgrade to review before Madrid. The French proposal for a conference on Disarmament in
Europe and the Eastern call for a conference on military detente
have stimulated interest in some sort of meeting among the states
participating in CSCE to discuss issues of military security. Holding post-Madrid meetings on concrete substantive aspects of economics and human rights as well as confidence-building measures
might also be something to consider. The United States intends
to consult widely with our allies and the other participants to
gain a clearer picture of what might be suitable. In considering
these initiatives for Madrid, one should not lose sight of the fact
that they are all secondary to the main objective, namely to improve implementation of the commitments written into the Final
Act.
There is a temptation in dealing with CSCE to indulge in righteous indignation about the failure of certain countries to live up
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to their obligations - in the Final Act, in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, in the UN Charter, and many other statements of basic human rights. There is also a temptation to use
CSCE as propaganda; the failure of so many Eastern regimes to
fulfill obligations is an indictment of the communist system in
practice. The use of CSCE as propaganda is particularly attractive if one has no hope that Eastern governments can ever be influenced to change. I believe, however, if we give into these temptations we will be doing a disservice to our nation and to the
hopes of mankind for universal respect for human rights. We
must recognize that the Soviets and their allies can have little
interest in a process which amounts to nothing more than periodic indictments of their performance. At the same time, the
West can have little interest in a process in which the communist
countries blatantly ignore obligations to human rights which are a
fundamental element of the process.
All signatories must realize that CSCE is a fragile process
which a single nation can terminate by refusing to agree to any
further meetings of the participants.
If the CSCE process is to prosper, it will be essential for the
United States to keep in mind the fundamental goal of our policy-to encourage concrete progress toward full implementation
of the Final Act. Our aim is not to make propaganda against the
communist system or to embarass the Soviet Union and its allies.
Our aim is to have the signatories of the Final Act honor the commitments they undertook freely at Helsinki. We recognize that
for the Soviet Union and some of its allies which emulate its practices, honoring those commitments means making rather fundamental changes in traditional autocratic practices. We do not expect those changes to occur immediately. We do expect gradual
progress and genuine commitment to their eventual realization.
The events of the past year have raised serious doubts in our
mind about whether certain signatories have any intention of
honoring their commitments. They have stepped backward instead of forward. To continuing failures with respect to human
rights, they have added a challenge to the most fundamental
principles of peaceful relations among sovereign states. CSCE
cannot continue to survive shocks like these.
Of all the methods we have for dealing with the East, of all the
concrete means established to work out the parameters of
detente, and of all the forums that have been constructed to improve what is, at best, a tense relationship with a strong and de-
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termined adversary, the Helsinki process is by far the broadest
and potentially most promising. The Helsinki process can lead us
beyond a bloc-to-bloc relationship to greater security for all. It
can mean wider understanding of the concepts of openness, pluralism and human rights. Whether this promise can be realized is,
at this point, an open question in view of Soviet actions. The
United States is committed to doing its part to achieve the goals
of Helsinki.

